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Narcotics Trafficking in West Africa:  
A Governance Challenge
Peter L. McGuire 
Abstract
West Africa is one of the most impoverished, underdeveloped, and instability-
prone regions in the world. Many of the nation-states in the region are empiri-
cally weak: they lack the capacity to deliver public goods and services to their 
citizens, do not claim effective control over their territories, are marked by 
high levels of official corruption, and are plagued by political instability and 
violent conflict. Since 2004 the region has faced an unprecedented surge in 
illicit narcotics (primarily cocaine) trafficking, raising fears within the inter-
national community that foreign (largely South American) trafficking groups 
would engender escalated corruption and violence across the region. This paper 
examines the effect that the surge in narcotics trafficking has had on gover-
nance and security in the region, paying particular attention to the experience 
of Guinea-Bissau and neighboring Republic of Guinea (Guinea-Conakry), 
two West African states that have been particularly affected by the illicit 
trade. The central argument presented is that narcotics trafficking is only one 
facet of the overall challenge of state weakness and fragility in the region. The 
profound weakness of many West African states has enabled foreign trafficking 
groups to develop West Africa into an entrepôt for cocaine destined for the large 
and profitable European market, sometimes with the active facilitation of 
high-level state actors. Thus, simply implementing counter-narcotics initiatives 
in the region will have a limited impact without a long-term commitment to 
strengthening state capacity, improving political transparency and accountabil-
ity, and tackling poverty alleviation and underdevelopment. Without address-
ing the root issues that allowed for the penetration of trafficking groups into 
the states of the region in the first place, West Africa will remain susceptible to 
similar situations in the future, undermining the region’s nascent progress in 
the realms of governance, security, and development.
The author expresses his gratitude to the Pardee Center and its staff  for the opportunity 
and the support to research and write “Narcotics Trafficking in West Africa: A Governance 
Challenge,” and extends his thanks to Moeed Yusuf, Abel Djassi, Jennifer Yanco, Edouard 
Bustin, and Nabeela Ahmed for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of  the paper.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 2004 there has been an unprecedented surge in the amount of cocaine 
being trafficked through the West African region.1 Between 2005 and 2008, 
46 metric tons (mt) of cocaine destined for the Western European market 
were seized by law-enforcement officials in or around West Africa, where 
only years before annual seizures of over one ton for the entire African 
continent were rare (UNODC 2008b, 3). Regional and international 
observers have expressed serious concerns that the sudden rise in trafficking 
will undermine the rule of law, encourage corruption, sow political instabil-
ity and violence, and corrode state capacity across the region (U.S. Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee 2009; UNODC 2007b; de Andres 2008). 
Antonio Maria Costa, the executive director of the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) argues that West African states  “…risk 
becoming shell-states: sovereign in name, but hollowed out from the inside 
by criminals in collusion with corrupt officials in the government and the 
security services...”(UNODC 2008b, 1). Similarly, Antonio L. Mazzitelli 
warns that failing to adequately respond to the threat of transnational 
organized crime in the region could “…result in the emergence of a number 
of pariah states ruled under faked democratic processes and serving as safe 
havens for all kinds of fugitive criminals…” and “…the appetite for quick 
and easy money accessible through criminal ventures may lead to coups 
d’état and long-lasting civil conflicts” (Mazzitelli 2007, 1088). 
The sudden rise in cocaine trafficking through West Africa indisputably has 
negative implications for governance, security, and development in the region. 
It is, however, crucial to recognize that cocaine trafficking is not a cause of 
state fragility and political corruption but is rather a symptom of the pre-
existence of these conditions in West Africa. In this sense, the central question 
facing domestic, regional, and international policy-makers concerned with 
drug smuggling and criminality in West Africa is not necessarily how to con-
front these challenges specifically, but how to encourage and aid the develop-
ment of overall state effectiveness and legitimacy across the region.  
1. For the purposes of this paper the West African region is considered to be the 16 member states of 
the Economic Community of West African States: Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Gambia, Guinea-Conakry, Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, 
and Cape Verde. 
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Figure 1: West Africa
Source: United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Map No. 4045 Rev.4, 
January 2004
The goal of this paper is to provide a preliminary view of the impact that 
cocaine trafficking has had on governance, security, and development 
within West Africa’s weakest states. Before continuing, it is important to 
outline some of the limitations inherent in researching clandestine trade and 
informal politics. Research on political corruption, narcotics trafficking, and 
criminality is limited by its necessarily clandestine nature. Rumor, suspicion, 
and conspiracy dominate accounts of criminal-political activity, and I have 
attempted to verify received information to the extent possible. The inher-
ent limitations to this research are apparent, and the conclusions reached 
should be interpreted cautiously. 
The paper is organized into five sections. The first section provides a brief 
assessment of some of the structural and political weaknesses evident in 
states across West Africa and the role that organized crime plays in exac-
erbating these weaknesses. The following section outlines the history of 
narcotics trafficking through the region and sheds some light on the reasons 
for the recent surge in cocaine trafficking since 2004. Then brief case studies 
focus on Guinea-Bissau and the Republic of Guinea (Guinea-Conakry), two 
West African states that have experienced serious effects from the cocaine 
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trade. Finally, the paper concludes with some cautious suggestions for future 
policies to enable West Africa’s weakest states to confront this current chal-
lenge and develop the capacity and integrity to adequately confront similar 
challenges in the future. 
DYNAMICS OF STATe WeAKNeSS AND ORGANIZeD CRIMe  
IN WeST AFRICA
Long considered a primarily domestic problem with limited international 
impact, the issues of state weakness and failure gained prominence in aca-
demic and policy circles shortly following the September 11 terrorist attacks 
(Patrick 2006, 27). State weakness and failure is now considered a threat to 
national and international security, and weak/failed states are often seen as 
incubators for international security threats such as transnational terrorism; 
organized crime; nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons proliferation; 
and contagious disease transmission (Patrick 2006, 33). International efforts 
have consequently focused on strengthening weak states and resuscitating 
failed states across the world, in the hope that strong, efficient, and account-
able states will be able to stave off the transnational threats they are believed 
to incubate. 
While state weakness and failure is a relative concept in that no two states 
are ever exactly the same, there are some general attributes and indicators 
that point to the severity of weakness in a given state. All too often, state 
weakness and failure is overly associated with widespread armed conflict 
(Rotberg 2002). Intra-state war is certainly an indicator of state failure, but 
an over-emphasis on violence overshadows other variables that contribute 
to profound state weakness and fragility. A recent index on state weakness 
written by Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick offers a more nuanced under-
standing of the phenomenon by ranking states according to their capacity 
to deliver public services. Consequently, the authors define weak states as 
those that “…lack the essential capacity and/or will to fulfill four sets of 
critical government responsibilities: fostering an environment conducive to 
sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing and maintaining 
legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; securing their 
populations from violent conflict and controlling their territory; and meet-
ing the basic human needs of their population” (Rice and Patrick 2008, 3). In 
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the conclusion to their report, Rice and Patrick also found that state weak-
ness is directly related to poverty, stating that “On balance, poorer countries 
tend to be weaker ones. Poverty fuels and perpetuates civil conflict, which 
swiftly and dramatically reduces state capacity” (Rice and Patrick 2008, 22). 
State weakness is therefore contingent on the capacity and will of a state to 
deliver essential public goods to their citizens, including economic oppor-
tunities, basic security, accountable governance, and social services. While 
weak, failing, and failed states are found in every region across the globe, the 
African continent has been particularly marked by state weakness, leading 
some observers to claim that “…state failure is a broadly African phenome-
non” (Englebert and Tull 2008, 108). While most of the continent is fragile, 
state weakness is especially pronounced in West Africa.  
West Africa is one of the poorest, least developed, and instability-prone 
regions in the world. The United Nations Development Program ranks 
13 out of the 16 countries in the West African region as “low human 
development” and fully half of the states in the region are in the bot-
tom 15 countries (UNDP 2009). Clearly, many West African states have 
proved to be unable to offer appreciable levels of development to their 
citizens. Exacerbating this dismal level of economic and human develop-
ment has been the unstable 
and often violent politics of 
the region. Since West African 
states gained independence from 
European colonial powers in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, the 
region’s political systems have 
been characterized by repressive 
authoritarian regimes, military 
coups and coup attempts, and 
bloody civil conflict.2 Within the region, only Cape Verde has been free 
of military intervention in domestic politics since independence, while 
the region overall has witnessed an astonishing 44 successful coups and 
2. The majority of West African states were independent from their former colonial powers, (principally 
Britain and France) by the early 1960s, with the exception of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, which did 
not gain full independence from Portugal until the mid 1970s.
Since West African states gained inde-
pendence from European colonial pow-
ers in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
the region’s political systems have been 
characterized by repressive authoritar-
ian regimes, military coups and coup 
attempts, and bloody civil conflict.
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43 failed coup attempts between 1955 and 2004 (McGowan 2006, 236). 
In the post-colonial period, West African states have been dominated by 
single-party authoritarian regimes characterized by repression, systematic 
corruption, nepotism, and gross economic mismanagement (N’Diaye, 
Saine, and Houngnikpo 2005, 181–183). West Africa also has experi-
enced periods of intense armed conflict, notably the regional conflict 
in the Mano River basin that included Liberia, Sierra Leone, and their 
neighbors. Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Senegal have also had civil conflict 
(Sawyer 2004). These conflicts have been marked by clandestine trade 
in arms and black market commodities including timber, diamonds, and 
oil. While the devastating conflicts that raged in the region in the 1990s 
have largely subsided, insecurity has not, and West African states still 
struggle to adequately control their borders and peripheral rural areas. The 
region remains awash with small arms, and in some countries the military 
remains unaccountable, abusive, and outside of full control by the govern-
ment (Florquin and Berman 2005; Kandeh 2004, 161–165). 
Despite its long history of conflict, economic crisis, and repressive gov-
ernance, many West African states are currently showing signs of signifi-
cant improvement in the rule of law, governance, political stability, and 
security (UNROWA 2008, 1). Legitimate multi-party democracies have 
been established and sustained in some countries (most notably Ghana 
and Senegal) and sincere efforts are being made to encourage government 
accountability, civil society, and economic development across the region. 
Yet West Africa remains a deeply troubled and unstable place. Rice and 
Patrick’s index, for example, lists eight out of the 16 states in West Africa 
as “critically weak” (Rice and Patrick 2008, 10–11).3 Corruption, which is 
rightly considered a major impediment to development and state effective-
ness, is also rampant within the region; the majority of West African states 
rank extremely low on Transparency International’s Corruption Percep-
tions Index (Transparency International 2008). While this summary of 
state weakness is brief, it nevertheless paints a picture of a region marked 
by high levels of institutional incapacity, political instability, unaccount-
3. Liberia, Cote D’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Niger, Togo, and Nigeria. The authors 
list only four West African states (Ghana, Senegal, Cape Verde, and Benin) in the top quintile of “states 
to watch.”
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able governance, and profound underdevelopment. It is precisely these 
pre-existing weaknesses that facilitated the development of West Africa 
into a central transit zone for Andean cocaine making its way to the prof-
itable Western European market. 
Since the end of the Cold War, transnational organized crime has become a 
central international security concern. The unregulated flow of illicit goods 
including weapons, narcotics, humans, and black market commodities of 
all types are a threat to the security and territorial integrity of the modern 
nation-state (Mittleman and Johnston 1999, 114–115). Moreover, organized 
criminal groups invest significant resources subverting the defenses that a 
state has erected to confront them. Often, providing an adequate level of 
security for a criminal enterprise requires that criminal actors develop part-
nerships with key state actors, such as law-enforcement, the judiciary, cus-
toms officials, and the security forces (Williams 2002, 165). While certainly 
no state is immune from the corrosive effects that transnational organized 
crime—particularly narcotics trafficking—has on state and society, it is 
clear that weak states are considerably more vulnerable to the ill-effects of 
organized crime than strong, functioning states. Phil Williams states that 
“…[transnational criminal organizations] flourish in states with weak struc-
tures and dubious legitimacy, which derives from economic inequalities, the 
dominance of traditional oligarchies, the lack of congruence between nation 
and state, poor economic performance, and ethnic divisions. In such cir-
cumstances, the development of parallel political and economic structures is 
almost inevitable” (Williams 1994, 109). In states exhibiting critical weak-
nesses, organized criminal groups find it easy to ensconce themselves within 
the structures of the state, remove state actors obstructing their enterprise, 
capture segments of key state institutions such as law enforcement, customs, 
and security forces, and—in extreme circumstances—confront the state 
directly (Lee and Thoumi 2003, 81; Godson 2003, 5; Zaitch 2002, 36; 
O’Neil 2009, 67–69).
The criminalization of state actors and institutions is dependent on the 
size and scale of the criminal enterprise: as the scale of a criminal enter-
prise grows, so too does its organizational complexity and visibility. It 
thus becomes necessary to compromise or co-opt higher levels of the state 
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apparatus, essentially moving from low-level bribery of customs or law-
enforcement officials, for example, to the active facilitation of the criminal 
enterprise by high-level political and state actors (Cornell 2006, 41). Trans-
national narcotics trafficking is characterized by a high degree of complexity 
and a multiplicity of actors all along the commodity chain from points of 
cultivation to target markets, and its monumental scale “…implies complex 
transnational communications and transport, which suggests protection 
(or tolerance) from national- and international-level police, military, and 
transportation authorities” (Bailey and Godson 2000, 20). Additionally, 
the degree to which state actors will be co-opted or removed is also highly 
dependent on previous modes of political organization; in countries with 
political systems marked by high degrees of informality, facilitation of crimi-
nal enterprises can become rapidly integrated into the political strategies of 
elites and office holders.
It is important to recognize that in many African countries political and 
economic power is exercised outside of the formal realm. Political systems 
in Africa exhibit high degrees of clientalism, patronage, and rent-seeking 
on the part of state actors: acquisition of positions within the state appara-
tus is the result of informal patron-client relationships, and these positions 
are used primarily to appropriate resources that can be used to strengthen 
one’s political and economic power (Medard 2002, 381). Moreover, as 
some scholars have argued, political elites make use of clandestine markets 
alongside the appropriation of state resources to contribute to their overall 
political and economic position (Reno 2000, 434–435). As a result, the 
ability of the state to provide public goods deteriorates as high-level sys-
temic corruption appropriates the resources needed for the public sector to 
operate effectively. Eventually, civil servants go unpaid and use their office 
to engage in rent-seeking simply to supplement their meager and some-
times non-existent salaries (Van de Walle 2004, 105). In some cases, such 
as Sierra Leone, the systemic appropriation of state resources by political 
elites gradually deteriorated the state itself, partially leading to the coun-
try’s civil war between 1990 and 2002 (Klay Kieh Jr. 2005, 166). Resource 
scarcity, exacerbated by personal appropriation, creates a context in which 
competition for political office becomes more intense, sometimes leading 
to political violence (Allen 1999, 376–381). While it would be disingenu-
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ous to claim that informal political and economic authority is the exclusive 
mode of politics in West Africa, framing an analysis from this lens holds 
significant explanatory power 
when considering the rapidity 
with which trafficking groups 
were able to partner with high-
level state actors in the region. 
Where political and economic 
power are run through informal, 
and sometimes illegal, channels 
in a resource-scarce environment 
characterized by intense compe-
tition, massive sums of money 
from narcotics trafficking may be 
quickly regarded as an opportunity for the accumulation of resources, and 
concurrently, political power. 
International narcotics trafficking groups are often well-organized and 
extremely profitable, which increases their ability to manipulate governance 
and undermine security (Naylor 1997, 20–21; Cornell 2006, 40–42). In 
2003, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) esti-
mated that “…the value of the global illicit drug market…was…US$13 bn 
[billion] at the production level, at $94 bn at the wholesale level (taking sei-
zures into account), and at US $322 bn based on retail prices and taking sei-
zures and other losses into account” (UNODC 2005, 127). The most recent 
data suggests that the cocaine market alone is worth $70 bn (UNODC 
2009b, 14). The most damaging internationally traded narcotics, in terms 
of their effects on security, governance, development, and social cost, are 
opiates and cocaine (INCB 2002, 1). The danger that narcotics trafficking 
groups pose to national security, in a very narrow sense, is evident in the 
experiences of Colombia during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and more 
recently in Mexico, where trafficking organizations have directly confronted 
the government, leading to thousands of deaths in armed conflict between 
well-armed traffickers and state security forces (Jordan 1999, 82; O’Neil 
2009, 67–69). 
Where political and economic power 
are run through informal, and some-
times illegal, channels in a resource-
scarce environment characterized by 
intense competition, massive sums of 
money from narcotics trafficking may 
be quickly regarded as an opportunity 
for the accumulation of resources, and 
concurrently, political power.
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Narcotics trafficking also has high social costs outside of the corruption of 
the public sphere. Increased distribution and abuse of narcotics are often 
seen in both production and transit states, bringing a host of other problems 
such as larger domestic criminal groups, lower economic productivity, and 
higher rates of drug addiction and dependence (INCB 2002, 7–8;  Williams 
1994, 108). What distinguishes cocaine and opiates from other illegal 
psychotropic substances is the distance between the areas of cultivation and 
production and the target markets, which are North America (principally 
the U.S.) and Western Europe (UNODC 2009a, 15). Narcotics that are 
trafficked through a series of transit states inevitably affect governance, secu-
rity, and development, even if these states are neither narcotics- producing 
nor narcotics-consuming countries. 
The dynamics of the international narcotics trade are marked by a high 
degree of fluidity and flexibility on the part of trafficking networks, espe-
cially when faced with increased law-enforcement efforts to obstruct 
functioning trafficking methods and routes (Allen 2005, 29). Where direct 
shipment to the target market is either too costly or risky, trafficking groups 
use transshipment through other states to penetrate the target market 
 (Friman 1995, 70–71). The rise in cocaine trade through West Africa in the 
last several years is indicative of the development of new transit states in the 
transnational commodity chain of Andean cocaine. Aside from the serious 
structural and institutional weakness of many West African states and the 
reality of informal governance within sub-Saharan Africa, the addition of 
pre-existing narcotics trafficking networks within the region has directly 
contributed to West Africa’s development into one of the key transit hubs 
for the international cocaine trade. 
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING IN WeST AFRICA BeFORe The SURGe
West Africa in particular and sub-Saharan Africa in general have a long 
history of cross-border smuggling networks—often working in coopera-
tion with state officials and political elites—for consumer goods, small 
arms, natural resources, and humans (Williams and Brooks 1999, 93–94; 
de Andres 2008, 205; Ellis 1999, 154–155). Moreover, West Africa has 
a particularly notorious history of being the home base for multiple drug 
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trafficking networks, primarily from Nigeria and Ghana (Ellis 2009, 176). 
Compared with the larger and more hierarchical trafficking groups found in 
other regions in the world, West African trafficking networks have remained 
small, flexible, and entrepreneurial (Ellis 2009, 176–177; Sun, Wyler, and 
Cook 2009, 26–27). A 2005 UNODC study of West African trafficking 
groups found that the most com-
mon form of trafficking network 
was “…a form of organization 
that is project-based. In this 
sense, criminal enterprises in 
West Africa use similar tech-
niques to legitimate traders and 
business people typical of lineage-
based societies. The standard 
procedure is for an individual 
entrepreneur who succeeds in 
making money in a particular 
field, as the volume grows, to 
invite one or more junior rela-
tives or other dependents to join 
himself or herself in the business” (UNODC 2005b, 15). West African 
trafficking groups rarely specialize in one particular product, and can refit 
their trafficking routes and methods in order to move into new commodity 
markets, both legal and illegal (UNODC 2005b, 17–18). Therefore, unlike 
other narcotics trafficking groups that specialize in one commodity for an 
extended period of time, West African networks are more business-focused, 
shifting their operations towards the largest profits where and when they are 
able. While West African narcotics trafficking groups remain small, flexible, 
and entrepreneurial, they have, since the 1980s, developed a substantial 
niche within the international narcotics trade.
As several scholars have observed, the inclusion of West African trafficking 
networks into the global narcotics trade was stimulated by the economic 
downturn in the region during the 1970s and 1980s, encouraging some West 
Africans to become involved in the trade in the absence of alternative liveli-
hoods that would provide similar returns (Shaw 2002, 294; Akyeampong 
Unlike other narcotics trafficking 
groups that specialize in one com-
modity for an extended period of 
time, West African networks are more 
business-focused, shifting their opera-
tions towards the largest profits where 
and when they are able. While West 
African narcotics trafficking groups 
remain small, flexible, and entrepre-
neurial, they have, since the 1980s, 
developed a substantial niche within 
the international narcotics trade.
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2005, 439). Early West African traffickers had a comparative advantage to 
other nationalities in the narcotics trade: customs officials and law enforce-
ment agencies in target countries were not suspecting narcotics to flow 
from West Africa (Ellis 2009, 177). The rise of West African trafficking 
groups in the global narcotics trade was stunning; by the mid-1980s more 
than 15,000 Nigerians had been arrested for drug charges across the world, 
and by 1989 U.S. authorities claimed that over half of the narcotics com-
ing into New York’s JFK international airport were from Nigerian groups 
(Ellis 2009, 180). Importantly, it does not appear that West African groups 
engaged in the bulk transshipment of narcotics from production regions to 
the profitable markets in North America and Western Europe. Rather, traf-
ficking networks delivered relatively small amounts of narcotics smuggled by 
human couriers aboard commercial airliners to target markets, where they 
were distributed through local networks (UNODC 2005, 21–22; Ellis 2009, 
186–188).
Before the surge in cocaine trafficking in the mid-2000s, West African traf-
ficking groups did not exhibit the same degree of influence on governance 
and politics in West African states, compared to the experience of other 
countries such as Colombia and Mexico (Bayart et al. 1999, 26–30). The 
small size and diversified nature of West African trafficking groups allowed 
these networks to develop profitable trafficking routes and techniques with-
out resorting to high levels of state infiltration or violence (UNCICP 2000, 
84). While West African traffickers did not develop the same type of crim-
inal-state relationships seen in other countries, their presence in the region 
helped facilitate the development of industrial transshipment during the 
mid-2000s. International criminal organizations often rely on pre-existing 
local groups to facilitate their entrance into new countries, although there 
are examples of confrontation as well (Williams 1994, 106). The existence 
of experienced West African criminal networks, many of which may have 
had relationships with Latin American cocaine producing and trafficking 
groups prior to the surge in bulk cocaine transiting West Africa (UNODC 
2005, 17; Ellis 2009, 186), can be seen as a contributing factor in the surge 
in bulk cocaine trafficking through the region after 2004.
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FROM eNTRePReNeURIALISM TO INDUSTRIAL TRANSShIPMeNT
Beginning in 2004, previously unheard of seizures of large amounts of 
cocaine began to be reported in and around West Africa. In 2008 UNODC 
reported that cocaine seizures in 
Africa represented 2.1 percent of 
the global total, as compared to 
2000, when they represented 0.1 
percent (UNODC 2008a, 79). In 
the first three quarters of 2007, 
an estimated 99 percent of the 
cocaine seized across the entire 
African continent was seized in 
West Africa (de Andres 2008, 
214). What made the surge in 
the seizures even more alarming 
was that, unlike previous seizures 
involving small amounts of narcotics, bulk shipments over 100 kilograms 
(kg) became increasingly common. 
In 2004, Ghanaian authorities seized 588 kg of cocaine in the major port 
city of Tema, which the U.S. State Department claimed to be “West Africa’s 
largest drug bust ever” (U.S. State Department INCSR 2005, 533). Also in 
2004, French and Togolese authorities seized 450 kg of cocaine off Togo’s 
coast (INCB 2004, 40). In 2005, the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB) reported that “Since the beginning of 2004, seizures of cocaine 
totaling some 40 tons have been effected on the high seas on ships coming 
from West Africa” (INCB 2005, 45).  
More record seizures were reported in the region in 2006 and 2007. In 
May 2006, Ghanaian authorities uncovered 1.9 metric tons (mt) of cocaine 
in the coastal village of Prampan, by far the largest single seizure in the 
country’s history (UNODC 2007a, 8). In June 2006, Nigerian authori-
ties reportedly seized a mixture of cocaine and cement totaling 14 mt in a 
shipping container in the Lagos harbor (Ugwoke 2006; INCB 2006, 38). 
In June 2007, Senegalese authorities stumbled upon 1.2 mt of cocaine in 
an abandoned boat on the southern coast of the country, and seized an 
In the first three quarters of 2007, an 
estimated 99 percent of the cocaine 
seized across the entire African con-
tinent was seized in West Africa (de 
Andres 2008, 214). What made the 
surge in the seizures even more alarm-
ing was that, unlike previous seizures 
involving small amounts of narcotics, 
bulk shipments over 100 kilograms 
(kg) became increasingly common.
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additional 1.2 mt of cocaine in a house nearby the first seizure (UNODC 
2007, 4; APF 2007a). Between 2006 and 2007, both the suspected volume 
of cocaine as well as the number of countries recording seizures totaling over 
100 kg rose dramatically: in 2006 only three countries—Ghana, Guinea-
Bissau, and Nigeria—reported seizures of more than 100 kg, while eight 
West African countries reported such seizures in 2007 (UNODC 2007b, 
10). Data from Europe in 2008 indicated that an estimated 22 percent of all 
cocaine seizures were suspected to have transited Africa, as compared to five 
percent of the total in 2004 (UNODC 2008a, 79). It was estimated that 
99 percent of the cocaine seized in Portugal in 2007 was trafficked through 
West African waters (UNODC 2008a, 79). Overall, UNODC estimated 
that $1.8 billion worth of cocaine, in wholesale prices, was being shipped 
through West Africa annually, a sum larger than the GDP of several West 
African countries (UNODC 2007b, 41). 
Figure 2: Cocaine Seizures in West Africa, 2000–2007
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Cocaine Trafficking in West 
 Africa: The Threat to Stability and Development (with Special Reference to Guinea-
Bissau). Vienna: UNODC 2007, 8.
*Preliminary data for 2006 based on available data as of November 2007. 
**From data collected by UNODC between January and November 2007.
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Importantly, many of the seizures in West Africa did not result from 
increased capacity or heightened surveillance on the part of law enforce-
ment. Instead UNODC reported that “…the circumstances surrounding 
the best-documented seizures suggest that most are made by chance, and 
that, in many instances, the amount seized was much less than the amount 
trafficked” (UNODC 2007b, 7). This indicates that the unprecedented 
surge in cocaine trafficking through the region did not coincide with an 
appreciable increase in West African law-enforcement capacity, but rather 
pointed to an even greater, unrecorded volume of cocaine passing through 
the region (de Andres 2008, 213).
The NeW DYNAMICS OF WeST AFRICA’S COCAINe TRADe
The abrupt shift from limited entrepreneurial trafficking networks to bulk 
transshipment of cocaine through West Africa is related to an overall shift 
in the international cocaine market and the development of newer and 
more profitable markets outside North America. Principally, the use of 
West Africa as a transshipment region is linked to the rapid expansion of 
the European cocaine market. The market for cocaine in Western Europe 
has expanded dramatically in recent years, and while North America still 
continues to be the largest consumer of cocaine, with nearly seven million 
users annually, the Western European market currently holds 3.9 million 
cocaine users, with an annual demand of between 135 to 145 mt of cocaine 
(UNODC 2009a, 80; UNODC 2007b, 8). Cocaine also fetches consider-
ably higher prices on the European market: the wholesale price per kilogram 
in Europe was almost double that in the United States in 2008 (UNODC 
2008a, 78). 
The rising demand of cocaine in Europe is combined with a steadily declining 
market in North America, and particularly in the United States (UNODC 
2008a, 87; UNODC 2009a, 81). Moreover, the rise of Mexican trafficking 
groups as key importers of cocaine to the United States, as well as the rela-
tive success of interdiction efforts in the Caribbean, deprived some South 
American traffickers direct access to the North American market (UNODC 
2007b, 17). The constriction of the North American cocaine market encour-
aged cocaine trafficking groups to re-orient their operations towards the rising 
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European market, increasingly using West African states as transit points along 
the way. The dynamics of the trade were reflected in new forms of trafficking, 
as well as an expansion of pre-existing trafficking routes.
Despite the addition of bulk shipments of cocaine through the region, West 
African trafficking groups continued to rely on the tried and true courier 
methods used since they became involved in the trade in the 1980s. The 
number of couriers entering European airports rose as West Africa became 
a transshipment region for bulk cocaine: from 2004 to 2008, more than 
1,300 couriers were detected coming into Europe via commercial airlines, 
and between 2006 and 2008, over two metric tons of cocaine were seized 
from couriers flying into European airports. According to UNODC, the 
percentage of traffickers nearly doubled in 11 European airports between 
2006 and 2007 (UNODC 2007b, 21; UNODC 2008b, 13). 
Shipments of bulk cocaine to West Africa by both air and sea appear to 
share similar methods. Bulk cocaine is brought in via these channels, where 
it is repackaged into smaller amounts and prepared for transshipment to 
European markets (UNODC 2007a, 8–9). Maritime shipments of cocaine 
originate in South America and sail across the Atlantic to West African 
ports, where cocaine is stockpiled for onward transfer to Europe (EURPOL 
2007, 4). Alongside a rise in maritime shipments, small airplanes specially 
outfitted for the flight across the Atlantic land on secured or obscured 
airstrips in West Africa where the cocaine is offloaded and repackaged for 
shipment to Europe (UNODC 2007b, 11–12). Between 2007 and 2008, 
multiple flights carrying hundreds of kilograms of cocaine were intercepted 
in or on their way to West Africa (Xinhua News 2007; UNODC 2007a, 
9; Australian Broadcasting Company 2007). The large-scale shipment of 
cocaine to West Africa by both air and maritime channels indicates the 
region’s serious law-enforcement and border control deficits, as traffickers 
demonstrated their ability to use both shipping and air infrastructure within 
West Africa to transfer bulk shipments of cocaine. With the rise in trans-
shipment of cocaine through the region, new dynamics of trafficking and 
new actors in the trade have also been noticed.
Currently, the cocaine trade through West Africa remains multifaceted, 
with multiple actors, including Latin American groups, pre-existing West 
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African trafficking networks, and new entrepreneurs engaging in the trade 
in separate but complementary capacities (Mazzitelli 2007, 1075–1076). 
West African networks continue to maintain their flexible and entrepreneur-
ial orientation while facilitating a larger and more substantial flow of bulk 
cocaine into European markets. Importantly, the trade has not yet experi-
enced the widespread use of violence that has accompanied narcotics traf-
ficking in other parts of the world, leading some observers to suggest that 
there is currently enough narcotics flowing through the region to accom-
modate the multiple actors and therefore keep destabilizing competition in 
check (UNODC 2008b, 28). 
It is important not to over-emphasize the amount of cocaine transiting West 
Africa as a percentage of the global narcotics trade. The surge in trafficking 
has indeed been startling, but, on the whole, West Africa still only accounts 
for a very small percentage of the cocaine that is trafficked internationally. 
Figure 3: Cocaine Trafficking Routes through West Africa
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Transnational Trafficking and 
Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment. Vienna: UNODC 2009, 13.
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While the trade through West Africa does not begin to rival that through 
North America, the potential profits that can be made from even small 
quantities of the drug increase its destabilizing effects, especially within 
weak, impoverished countries. As the following case studies illustrate, even 
the relatively modest flow of cocaine has had serious effects on West Africa’s 
weakest states.
COCAINe TRAFFICKING, GOVeRNANCe, AND STABILITY  
IN WeST AFRICA’S WeAKeST STATeS
While the recent boom in cocaine trafficking has had effects on nearly every 
state in the region, it has had the most deleterious impact on Guinea-Bissau 
and Guinea-Conakry, two of the most underdeveloped, politically unstable, 
and institutionally dysfunctional states in West Africa. Considering that 
organized crime most visibly affects states that are already fragile, it is little 
surprise that foreign trafficking 
groups found these states to be 
easily exploitable gateways from 
which to conduct their business. 
While both Guinea-Bissau and 
Guinea-Conakry have similar 
attributes in terms of institutional 
weakness and severe capacity 
gaps, the post-colonial gover-
nance experience of the two 
countries is very different. Therefore, the effects on governance, stability, 
and development that cocaine has had within the two states are unique, and 
echo the specific aspects of state fragility that existed in the two countries 
prior to the boom in cocaine trafficking after 2004.
Guinea-Bissau: A West African ‘Narco-State’?
Guinea-Bissau is one of the smallest and least developed states in West 
Africa. Since independence from Portugal in 1974, the country has been 
plagued with political instability, economic stagnation, endemic corrup-
tion, civil violence, and a deep rift between state and society  (Forrest 2002, 
236–263). The country’s politics are marked by competition for control of 
The effects on governance, stability, 
and development that cocaine has had 
within the two states are unique, and 
echo the specific aspects of state fra-
gility that existed in the two countries 
prior to the boom in cocaine trafficking 
after 2004.
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state resources between opposing factions based on informal patron-client 
relationships (Forrest 2002, 239). As Estanislao Gacitua-Mario et al. state: 
“Political power in Guinea-Bissau is concentrated in an executive subject to 
limited checks and balances from weak democratic institutions. The state 
also retains main control over access to the majority of resources in the 
country. As a result, the stakes are high for the presidency and key politi-
cal positions, undermining efforts at building national unity in a country 
with more than 20 ethnic groups, widespread poverty, and great disparities 
between people” (Gacitua-Mario et al. 2007, 29). The military operates 
autonomously from civilian government control and is highly influential, 
although the military itself has had internal factional struggles over power 
and resources (ICG 2009a, 7–8; Observatoire de l’Afrique 2008, 6–7). The 
country experienced a brief civil war between the President Joao Bernardo 
Vieira and a dominant faction in the military led by Chief of Staff Asumane 
Mane between 1998 and 1999, which devastated the country’s already 
meager infrastructure—especially in the capital city (Sid-Barry and Wodon 
2007, 14).  
A deeply impoverished and profoundly underdeveloped country, Guinea-
Bissau relies on trade dominated by cashew nuts, which represent 95 per-
cent of its total exports (EIU 2008, 30). Guinea-Bissau’s law-enforcement 
agencies, while remarkably large, are poorly resourced and underpaid, its 
correctional facilities are almost non-existent, and its judicial system is weak 
and does not operate independently from powerful state actors (UNODC 
2007b, 14–16; Vincent 2007, 4; Observatiore de l’Afrique 2008, 4–5; IRIN 
2009d). The Guinea-Bissauan state is also incapable of providing more than 
minimal public services, and, consequently, citizens have a lack of faith and 
trust in the institutions of the state (Gacitua-Mario et al. 2007, 34–37).  
Compounding the susceptibility of the state to organized crime, the govern-
ment lacks the capacity to fully exert control over the entirety of its territory, 
especially across the 80 sparsely populated islands that make up the Bijagos 
Archipelago (Vulliamy 2008). Some observers of Guinea-Bissau have gone 
as far as to declare that the state in Guinea-Bissau simply does not exist in 
any coherent form: “The state in Guinea-Bissau appears as a legal and socio-
logical fiction devoid of any sovereignty or moral or political authority that 
can survive beyond its empirical existence, shored up by external economic 
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help and international regulations and agreements” (Bordonaro 2009, 37). 
The undeniable weakness of the structures of the state itself—a poorly paid, 
unaccountable, and divided armed forces; informal political culture; and 
crippling poverty and economic stagnation—has left a situation that foreign 
trafficking groups were able to exploit to their advantage.
At the height of the cocaine boom in the late 2000s, Guinea-Bissau was rec-
ognized as one of the principal transit countries for cocaine into West Africa 
(UNODC 2007b, 5). The structural weakness of the state and the corrupt-
ibility of state actors and political elites allowed foreign trafficking groups 
to operate with near-impunity, even to the point where some traffickers 
established a physical presence in the country, evidenced by the purchase 
of up-scale estates and the unprecedented surge of luxury vehicles (Sullivan 
2008). The rapid criminalization of key state actors has been concurrent 
with the surge of cocaine trafficking through the country (Vincent 2007, 
2–3; ICG 2008b, 21–23). There are many instances of military resources 
being used in facilitating bulk shipments of cocaine into the country; there 
are multiple reports of soldiers using military resources to transport cocaine 
within Guinea-Bissau, of aircraft delivering bulk shipments through military 
airfields, as well as the disappearance of hundreds of kilos of the drug from 
official custody (UNSC 2007, 6; U.S. State Department INCSR 2009, 
295). It is also widely believed that key individuals in the state are deeply 
involved in the cocaine trade, including the former head of the navy, Jose 
Na Tchuto, who attempted a coup shortly after the presidential elections in 
2008 (Africa Confidential 2008a). While a lack of concrete evidence makes 
it difficult to pinpoint exactly which state actors are involved in the trade, 
the facilitation of trafficking and the obstruction of investigations into the 
trade indicate that relationships between foreign traffickers and military 
and political elites have gone beyond bribery and low-level entrepreneurial 
trafficking to large-scale, active facilitation of trafficking tons of cocaine 
through the country.
The huge cocaine trade has also contributed to insecurity in the country. 
Guinea-Bissau’s history includes high levels of political violence, but the recent 
surge in this violence in the past few years may be associated with increased 
competition over access to the cocaine trade. It has been suggested that the double 
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murders of President Vieira and Military Chief of Staff General Tagme Na 
Wai in March 2009 were related to the cocaine trade, although no irrefutable 
evidence has been brought forward to substantiate this claim (Baldauf 2009; 
Vernaschi 2009; ICG 2009b, 3). Other events, including an attempted coup in 
2008 and the subsequent arrest of the Chief of Staff of the navy, have also been 
tied to involvement in and competition over control of the cocaine trade (ICG 
2009a, 9–10; Africa Confidential 2008a, 9). The addition of a highly profitable 
illegal trade through Guinea-Bissau has upped the ante in the country’s already 
violent struggles for political and economic power (ICG 2009b, 1). 
A further indication of direct political and military involvement in cocaine 
trafficking can be seen in the increasing intimidation by the military and 
political elites of human rights activists, journalists, and members of the 
judiciary who have been active in publicly exposing the relationships between 
traffickers and state actors (Vincent 2007, 3–4; IFJ 2007; AFP 2007b; 
Latham 2008). Moreover, the 
influx of cocaine has encouraged 
the development of a nascent 
domestic market, and there are 
indications that cocaine purchas-
ing and use is widespread across 
the country and especially within 
the capital city (IRIN 2008a). 
Fishermen in Guinea-Bissau, 
facing greater expenses and fewer 
profits in their traditional occupa-
tion, have moved into facilitating 
cocaine trafficking by transferring 
shipments of cocaine from large 
transport ships to stockpiles on the country’s poorly monitored coasts (IRIN 
2008b). In total, Guinea-Bissau may represent the sum of the worst fears that 
observers had for the effect of narcotics trafficking in the region. The country’s 
institutions have been compromised, its civil society intimidated, its political 
stability threatened by factional intrigues and violence, and its impoverished 
citizens have increasingly become involved in the trade as a source of liveli-
hood. While there have been suggestions that foreign traffickers have recently 
In total, Guinea-Bissau may represent 
the sum of the worst fears that observ-
ers had for the effect of narcotics 
trafficking in the region. The country’s 
institutions have been compromised, 
its civil society intimidated, its politi-
cal stability threatened by factional 
intrigues and violence, and its impov-
erished citizens have increasingly 
become involved in the trade as a 
source of livelihood.
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abandoned Guinea-Bissau (Thomas 2009), the structural, political, and eco-
nomic deficiencies that led the country to be a cocaine entrepôt have not been 
addressed. While the election of Malam Bacai Sanhá in July 2009 gives some 
cause for hope that the country can seize this opportunity to put urgently 
needed reforms into place, many of Guinea-Bissau’s structural and political 
weaknesses have yet to be addressed (UN News Service 2009).
Guinea-Conakry: From Criminal Regime to Criminal Regime 
Like Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry has a post-colonial history charac-
terized by political instability, economic stagnation, underdevelopment, 
violence, and corruption. Since independence in 1958, the country has had 
only three heads of state, two of whom gained office through military coups 
(ICG 2007, 1; BBC News 2008). Lansana Conté, who seized power in a 
coup d’état in 1984, maintained his regime by cultivating the loyalty of mil-
itary, business, and political elites by allowing them to develop private for-
tunes via the state coffers, as well as fully controlling elections after Guinea 
went through democratization in the 1990s (ICG 2007, 2–3). The regime 
resorted to brute force to maintain its hegemony within the state, evidenced 
by the brutal crackdown on unions and civil society groups during a general 
strike in 2007 (HRW 2007a). Guinea-Conakry’s law enforcement and 
judiciary are underfunded, understaffed, poorly equipped, and lack the 
necessary training to confront narcotics trafficking organizations that have 
benefitted from the impunity exercised by political and military elites at the 
core of state power (U.S. State Department INCSR 2009, 292–293). 
Before the military coup in December 2008, the extent of the trade through 
Guinea-Conakry was not fully understood, although it was widely believed 
that cocaine traffickers had developed strong relationships with political and 
military elites, and especially with members of the President’s inner circle (ICG 
2008a, 5–6). The fact that couriers embarking from Guinea vastly outnumbered 
those coming from other West African airports according to arrest data from 
European airports between 2006 and 2008 suggested that the country was a 
key transit state for cocaine trafficking (UNODC 2008b, 16).4 The political 
4. According to UNODC, 88 out of 100,000 people flying from Guinea-Conakry were detected as couriers, 
compared to the next highest country, Mali, which had 49 per 100,000. Moreover, Guinea-Conakry ranked 
third, with 13% after Senegal (17%) and Nigeria (16%), as a share of the total volume of cocaine detected on 
couriers flying into Europe during the same period.  
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protection offered to traffickers resulted in a low volume of arrests and almost 
no convictions of individuals accused of trafficking cocaine, as well as the 
repeated reclamation of cocaine seized by the country’s underfunded and poorly 
staffed counter-narcotics unit (IRIN 2008c).5 Despite the widespread belief that 
state actors close to the President were fully involved in cocaine trafficking, the 
full extent of this state facilitation remained shrouded in rumor and speculation 
until the December 2008 coup.
Conté’s death in December 2008 was immediately followed by a military 
coup by junior officers led by a relatively unknown army Captain, Moussa 
Dadis Camara (Gettlemen 2008). The junta, naming itself the National 
Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD), attracted considerable 
public support for its aggressively stated intention to confront corruption 
and criminality within the Guinean political system (ICG 2009d, 5–6; 
Africa Confidential 2009a, 4). In late February, the CNDD arrested a clique 
of high-ranking members of the security forces, including the former Presi-
dent’s eldest son, Ousmane Conté (APF 2009a; AP 2009a). In a televised 
confession after his arrest, Ousmane and the other detainees provided details 
of the extent to which the inner circle of the Conté regime had used state 
resources to facilitate cocaine trafficking through the country (Callimachi 
2009; Africa Confidential 2009b, 9). Further arrests followed in June, when 
high ranking military officials of the former regime, including the heads of 
army and navy, were also charged with trafficking (UPI 2009). Although 
the CNDD gained public praise for its actions against Conté’s inner circle, 
the arrests and confessions of members of Conté’s regime also have been 
criticized within the country; the country’s judges led a strike in opposition 
to the parallel justice system erected by the CNDD, and rights groups in the 
country claimed that the arrests were politically selective, and that members 
of the CNDD are equally responsible for drug trafficking but have not been 
arrested (AP 2009b; Callimachi 2009). 
The possibility that the CNDD is using accusations of drug trafficking 
as a political tool against opponents in the former regime and within the 
5. The extent of elite culpability with the drug trade was made apparent in 2008, when the seizure of an 
airplane delivering cocaine in the town of Boke, thought to be one of the main axes of shipment into the 
country, resulted in the arrest of high-level political actors, including the governor, mayor, and military 
commander in the state.
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opposition political parties and critical civil society in order to consolidate 
power within the country and avoid elections should not be ruled out. For 
example, in March 2009 CNDD troops raided the home of a union leader 
on suspicion of cocaine trafficking, an oddity in the general trend towards 
arresting members of the former ruling clique (AFP 2009b). There is a 
definite precedent for the instrumental use of corruption allegations against 
political rivals in many different situations in Africa and elsewhere, and in 
this sense, the actions of the CNDD are not unique (Chabal and Daloz 
1999, 104; Szeftel 1998, 236). The danger posed in this context is not the 
manipulation of the state by narcotics trafficking groups, but the entrench-
ment of a dictatorial military junta in the country, where there is no pre-
cedent for a democratic political transition (ICG 2009a, 11).
Recent developments in the country indicate that the CNDD is, in fact, 
unprepared to hand over power to a democratically elected government. 
Initial popular support for Camara and the CNDD has rapidly evaporated 
as the junta has resorted to repression and brutality to maintain its power 
in the country. Moreover, the military has faced increasing fragmenta-
tion; separate factions within the CNDD are believed to be recruiting rival 
militias and developing political and economic networks in competition 
with one another, which has led to a rise in ethnic tensions within the 
country (ICG 2009b, 5–7). Furthermore, Camara has reneged on his initial 
promise that no individual from the CNDD would stand for office in the 
elections. A rumor that the CNDD leader would, in fact, be standing for 
election resulted in a protest organized by a coalition of opposition parties 
and civil society groups in Conakry on September 28, 2009: the demonstra-
tion immediately faced a brutally violent crackdown by the military result-
ing in more than 150 deaths and widespread sexual violence against female 
protestors (Nossiter 2009; HRW 2009c). The recent violence and repression 
in Guinea further indicates that focus on the region should not be concen-
trated only on combating the trafficking itself, but on actively confronting 
the deeper challenges of unaccountable political leadership, corruption, 
political repression, and poverty. Therefore, although the criminalization of 
state actors may now be less of a threat, the possibility that Guinea-Conakry 
will revert to the status quo of unaccountable, personalized leadership remi-
niscent of the two previous regimes does not augur well for future develop-
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ment of the country, with or without the presence of cocaine trafficking 
networks. 
What is particularly disturbing about the examples of Guinea-Bissau and 
Guinea-Conakry is the astonishing speed with which foreign trafficking 
groups were apparently able to establish firm relationships with high level 
state officials. Assuming that the boom in cocaine trafficking through West 
Africa began between 2003 and 2004, it is stunning that firm relationships 
between high-level state actors and trafficking groups were forged in such a 
short period of time. The structural weakness of these two states left them 
exposed to cocaine trafficking 
and allowed political and military 
elites to profit off the trade by 
integrating it into already existing 
political and economic networks. 
It is, therefore, important to keep 
in mind that narcotics trafficking 
only contributes to the environ-
ment of state fragility and politi-
cal instability already apparent in 
West Africa. The real threat that continued high levels of narcotics traffick-
ing in the region poses is the exacerbation of these weaknesses, and a pos-
sible reversal of the overall progress the region has made in improving the 
rule of law, economic development, democratic governance, and security. 
LOOKING TOWARDS The FUTURe:  
POLICY DIReCTIONS FOR WeST AFRICA
It is currently believed that the cocaine trade through West Africa is 
 declining at almost as rapid a pace as it rose. Recent data indicate that the 
suspected volume of the trade has declined precipitously since 2008; both 
the number of seizures in West Africa as well as the number of couriers 
apprehended in Europe has rapidly fallen off (UNODC 2009b, 16–17). 
While this is undoubtedly a positive sign, it would be inappropriate to 
declare that the threat has conclusively passed. The sudden drop in traffick-
ing in the region could be a sign that efforts to disrupt the trade have been 
What is particularly disturbing about 
the examples of Guinea-Bissau and 
Guinea-Conakry is the astonishing 
speed with which foreign trafficking 
groups were apparently able to estab-
lish firm relationships with high-level 
state officials.
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successful, but could also indicate that traffickers and their state partners 
have been more successful in concealing the trade. Moreover, cocaine is not 
the only commodity that is illegally trafficked through the region. Looted 
oil, cigarettes, counterfeit medication, small arms and ammunition, and 
humans are all trafficked across West Africa and rely on the same weaknesses 
and incapacities as the trade in cocaine (UNODC 2009b, 11). Overall, the 
conditions that led to West Africa’s rapid development into a transit hub for 
cocaine trafficking need to be addressed. As this paper has emphasized, the 
challenge for the region does not primarily come from the cocaine trade, 
but stems from the endemic weakness of the states in the region. Therefore, 
it is ultimately necessary for stakeholders in the region to promote long-
term policies aimed at strengthening and legitimizing West Africa’s weak 
states. West African states did not implode overnight: institutional decay 
developed over decades of misrule and economic stagnation. Assuming that 
West African states possess the institutional capacity and political will to 
rapidly implement counter-narcotics policies is inappropriate and unhelp-
ful. Immediate funding for counter-narcotics is urgently needed, and may 
deliver some marginal returns in the short term, but these initiatives remain 
woefully underfunded and are overwhelmingly targeted towards support-
ing regional law enforcement efforts (Sun, Wyler, and Cook 2009, 29–38.) 
Current policies are not taking into account the overall challenge of state 
weakness that encouraged the development of narcotics trafficking in the 
first place. Thus, I have eschewed making firm policy proposals in favor 
of broader, long-term policy directions. Even if short-term policies along 
multiple levels are enacted in West Africa to confront cocaine trafficking, 
they will not substantially contribute to developing state capacity unless 
they have been organized around longer-term goals, including the following:
ending Impunity: The cycle of unaccountable and corrupt political leader-
ship in West Africa is one of the primary reasons that international traf-
ficking groups were able to so rapidly penetrate the region’s weak states. It 
is imperative that steps are taken to end the impunity that West African 
elites have enjoyed. Where impunity reigns there is rarely an independent 
move for reform. Elite involvement in cocaine trafficking, for example, is a 
serious violation of international law, and should be treated as such. Sup-
port and resources should be directed towards domestic and international 
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enquiries into the role of elites and state actors in illicit trafficking. Donor 
support should be invested in developing autonomous and legitimate anti-
corruption institutions within West Africa’s weak states as well as support-
ing domestic corruption investigations and trials with resources and legal 
expertise. International support for domestic investigations and prosecutions 
against criminals and elites, as long as they are judged to be legitimate, will 
aid progress in helping to end impunity and deter similar actions by elites in 
the future. In the absence of a commitment to investigate, try, and pun-
ish criminal activity on the part of state actors, there will be little incentive 
for future political leaders and state elites to independently enact adequate 
reforms. 
Not only is it imperative that impunity be confronted to deter the politi-
cal corruption that is deeply corrosive to the capacity of the state itself, it 
is also urgent to identify domestic partners that possess the political will to 
carry out necessary reforms. For 
example, confronting the cocaine 
trade by partnering with institu-
tions and state actors who may be 
involved in the trade themselves 
will, on the whole, accomplish 
very little. The international com-
munity should not simply assume 
that state actors and political 
elites are automatically oriented 
towards serving the public interest (Englebert and Tull 2008, 109–110), and 
should make sure that the selected domestic partners are committed to the 
long-term development of their states. 
Professional Development and Security Sector Reform: As stated, the poverty 
and clientalistic politics of some West African states have led to a deeply 
inefficient, unprofessional, and under-resourced civil service. In order to 
provide critical public goods, the civil service needs to be professionalized. 
Employment and promotion needs to be based on demonstrated compe-
tence and effectiveness, not nepotism. If the civil service demonstrates that 
it can provide public goods and is responsive to the needs of citizens, state 
Not only is it imperative that impunity 
be confronted to deter the political 
corruption that is deeply corrosive to 
the capacity of the state itself, it is also 
urgent to identify domestic partners 
that possess the political will to carry 
out necessary reforms.
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legitimacy will be enhanced. Moreover, citizens who have felt excluded from 
the state may have more confidence in its general ability to deliver public 
goods. Donor attention should be focused on developing the civil service in 
these countries in partnership with the domestic government. Professional 
training and bureaucratic infrastructure should be especially highlighted 
for critical attention, and pursued sustainably by developing mechanisms 
designed to monitor the effectiveness and transparency of public sector 
employees.
Similarly, in some West African states, and especially in Guinea-Bissau and 
Guinea-Conakry, security sector reform is essential. Without accountable 
and effective military and law enforcement services, it will be impossible to 
provide a basic level of physical security to citizens, arguably the state’s most 
important responsibility. Since independence, West Africa’s security ser-
vices have demonstrated a disturbing proclivity to intervening in domestic 
politics. While some states in the region have been able to rein in and subor-
dinate the security services to civilian authority, others have not. Unsurpris-
ingly, security sector reform in the two Guineas presents a serious challenge. 
In both states, the military is politically powerful and may regard security 
sector reform, especially if conducted by the international community, to 
be a challenge to its authority and position in the country (Observatoire de 
l’Afrique 2007, 6). The inclusion of huge sums of money from extra-legal 
sources (such as cocaine) offers a further disincentive for the security services 
to implement reforms (Observatoire de l’Afrique 2008, 7). Despite the 
inherent challenges in reforming a recalcitrant security sector, it is critical 
that security sector reform take place before West Africa’s weakest states can 
move forward in terms of governance, security, and economic development.
Supporting Civil Society: It is understandably important that serious atten-
tion be paid to enhancing state capacity in order to confront the challenges 
posed by cocaine trafficking, but it is equally important that efforts are also 
aimed at supporting domestic civil society. An exclusive focus on state-
building may ignore the important role that civil society can play in contrib-
uting to security and rule of law. Human rights organizations, academics, 
journalists, and community and religious groups are often on the front line 
of investigating and criticizing corruption and the abuse of power on the 
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part of state actors and political elite. Vocal critics often face intimidation, 
harassment, detention, and violence. Civil society can play an active role in 
providing checks on unaccountable political leadership through publishing 
reports, holding demonstrations, and disseminating information to citi-
zens of the state and to international audiences. Taking this into account, 
it is crucial that the important role that these critical actors can play is not 
ignored or sidelined in the pursuit of state-centric capacity building. Long-
range efforts to strengthen the capacity and legitimacy of the state will not 
be comprehensive unless civil society is allowed to play an important role. 
If nothing else, vocal support for the activities of civil societies from the 
international community can provide a degree of confidence for domestic 
activists. Enhancing the visibility of civil society actors through regional and 
international recognition of their activities can put added pressure on unac-
countable elites and state actors to reform, but the physical safety of these 
actors should always be taken into account; a high level of international 
visibility could lead to increased harassment and even violence against civil 
society actors by those who feel threatened by their actions. Again, this sup-
port needs to be a long-term commitment; it is not enough to speak out in 
condemnation on a periodic basis when an individual human rights activist 
or journalist faces repression. 
Poverty Alleviation and economic Development: The challenges that endemic pov-
erty presents to the state in West Africa are numerous and long-standing. More 
than any other challenges facing the region, poverty alleviation and economic 
development will take the most time, resources, patience, and commitment 
to address. Unfortunately, because of the time and resources necessary to be 
devoted to this task, there is often a sense of fatigue on the part of donor govern-
ments and the international community. This may be unavoidable, as economic 
development has been undertaken, often with marginal returns, across the Afri-
can continent since independence. While this is the most daunting challenge 
facing West Africa, it is crucial that continued efforts be made to tackle it. In the 
absence of more stable and diversified economies, citizens’ living standards will 
not appreciably rise. When this is the case, the state is unable to develop a tax 
base, leading to an over-reliance on donor funds simply to conduct the (mini-
mal) responsibilities of the state. In order to build functional and effective states 
in the region, effective poverty alleviation and economic development programs 
Narcotics Trafficking in West Africa   31
need to be pursued with long-term commitments. 
None of these policy directions can be said to be more important than 
another. Moreover, none can be pursued independently of each other. Politi-
cal accountability requires a strong and vocal civil society to work. Public 
sector development and security sector reform require institutional capacity 
and adequate physical infrastructure. Economic development and poverty 
alleviation need political stability and effective economic policies. Strength-
ening weak states requires multiple overlapping initiatives at the domestic, 
regional, and international levels. It is further crucial that whatever poli-
cies are finally adopted to strengthen West Africa’s weak states be regarded 
as legitimate by the citizens of these countries. Focusing efforts solely on 
combating the cocaine trade itself are necessary, but will only go so far. The 
attention that cocaine trafficking receives from the international community 
can, however, be beneficial to the overall development of West Africa’s weak-
est states. Efforts directed at confronting the flow of narcotics through the 
region should be used as a springboard to address the underlying root issues 
that contributed to the development of the trade in the first place.
Ordinary West Africans deserve functioning, effective states in order to real-
ize their potential. Without addressing the endemic weaknesses confronting 
West Africa, these states will remain vulnerable to the devastating effects of 
cocaine trafficking, as well as other forms of trans-national clandestine trade 
and insecurity. It is primarily for the benefit of the citizens of these countries 
that these underlying issues must be addressed.
CONCLUSION 
The surge in bulk cocaine trafficking in West Africa presents serious chal-
lenges to governance, development, and security within the region’s fragile 
states. West Africa should be recognized as the prime target for the trans-
shipment of bulk cocaine en route to the European market that it appears 
to have become, and for the severity of the effects that this practice has had 
across the region. It has been astonishingly influential in Guinea-Bissau and 
Guinea-Conakry, two of the weakest states in the region. 
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It is important to keep in mind, however, that the cocaine trade in West 
Africa remains marginal in terms of the global cocaine industry. Moreover, 
recent data indicates a significant drop in the quantity of cocaine transit-
ing the region, indicating that the surge in trafficking from 2005 to 2008 
may not be sustainable (UNODC 2009a, 73–74). This is important, as the 
serious long-term effects of the trade on the region as a whole may only be 
readily apparent if a sustained trade developed over a longer period of time. 
In this sense, governance in West Africa may not be transformed as a result 
of the cocaine trade at its present levels.
Organized crime and narcot-
ics trafficking rarely criminalize 
strong, functioning states; the 
effect is felt the most within 
fragile dysfunctional states, often 
with a prior history of corruption 
and instability. Success in con-
fronting the challenges posed by 
the narcotics trade in West Africa 
is not necessarily contingent on 
confronting the trade itself, but 
on strengthening the capacity 
and rule of law within the states 
that are at most risk from its 
ill-effects. This is necessarily a long-term project and depends on the com-
mitment and coordination of domestic, regional, and international stake-
holders. Narcotics trafficking and the influence of criminal organizations in 
West Africa are symptoms of larger and more entrenched difficulties, and 
cannot be confronted and remedied independently of the other serious chal-
lenges facing West Africa’s weakest states.
Success in confronting the challenges 
posed by the narcotics trade in West 
Africa is not necessarily contingent 
on confronting the trade itself, but on 
strengthening the capacity and rule of 
law within the states that are at most 
risk from its ill-effects. This is neces-
sarily a long-term project and depends 
on the commitment and coordination 
of domestic, regional, and international 
stakeholders.
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